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"'I have done that,' says my memory. 'I cannot have done that,'
says my pride, and remains inexorable."**
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, the European Union Court of Justice recognized a so-
called right to be forgotten.' The right in question was officially de-
clared to be fundamental in character.2 The contours of this right will
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of
Law.
** FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL: PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE
80 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Vintage 1989) (1886) (aphorism 68); see also Timothy Garton Ash,
Bad Memories, ATLAS OF TRANSFORMATION, http://monumenttotransformation.org/
atlas-of-transformation/ html/m/memory/bad-memories-timothy-garton-ash.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 12, 2015).
1. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espaliola de Protecci6n de Datos, Mario
Costeja Gonz~ilez (May 13, 2014), available at http://curia.europa.eu (citing Council Directive
95/46, arts. 2, 4, 7-9, 14, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC)). The various national data protection agencies
may order delinking, under specific name searches, to the data in question, if not the actual
removal of the underlying posted data itself. Id. at 100. The European Union is seeking a trans-
national framework for data protection law. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/jus-
tice/ data-protection/ document/review2012/com_2012 11 en.pdf [hereinafter EU General
Data Protection Regulation]. The rubric of "data protection" in these cases is arguably a bit mis-
leading. For ongoing commentary, see, for example, Essential Guide: EU Data Protection Regula-
tion, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM, www.computerweekly.com/guides/Essential-Guide-What-
the-EU-Data-Protection-Regulation-changes-mean-to-you (last visited Apr. 2, 2015). For the
specific language of forgetting, see for example, Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 20, 89, 91.
2. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 81, 91, 97,99.
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doubtlessly evolve,3 but for the moment Europe recognizes a personal
right to ask internet search engine owners to remove links to third
party web pages that appear following searches using one's name in
the search query.4 The person requesting the delinking need not show
prejudice, or the inaccuracy of the underlying post or web page.5 Ra-
ther, the search engine operator is now legally required to consider
whether the third party post or web page is, at the present time, "in-
adequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or
excessive....",
The owner of the search engine in question,7 in making that crucial
determination, must consider "all the circumstances of the case."' The
general presumption is that the interests of the data subject, or re-
questing party, should override "not only the economic interest of the
3. See EU General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 1; see also Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art., 8,10, Nov. 4,1950,213 U.N.T.S. 236.
4. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, TT 91-94. It should go without saying that in any realistic
form, the so-called "right to be forgotten" is not to be taken in any remotely literal sense. Id. The
case law thus far focuses entirely upon specific events, actions, occurrences, status determina-
tions, or other elements of a person's much broader life, personhood, or identity. See, e.g., id.
5. See id. T 92-94, 96, 99.
6. Id. 94; see also id. 92-93.
7. These would include Google's search engines accommodating European countries, as
well as parallel operations of such search engines as Bing and Yahoo. For a one-stop shopping
option encompassing results from more than one search engine, see forget.me, https://for-
get.me (last visited Apr. 22, 2015); Adam Westlake, Bing, Yahoo Begin Accepting European 'Right
to Be Forgotten' Requests, SLASHGEAR (November 29, 2014), http://www
.slashgear.com/bing-yahoo-begin-accepting-european-right-to-be-forgotten-requests
-29357778/. See also 2013 Search Engine Market By Country, RETURN ON Now, http://re-
turnonnow.com/intemet-marketing-resources/2013-search-engine-market-share
-by-country/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2015) (showing one incarnation of Google or another cur-
rently dominates the European market). Whether European law should also be binding on
Google's broader global operations is currently controversial. See, e.g., Lisa Vaas, Google Fined
for Not Taking Down "Right to be Forgotten" Links Worldwide, NAKEDSECURITY (Nov. 19, 2014),
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/11/19/google-fined-for-not-taking-downright-to
-be-forgotten-links-worldwide/; Sam Schechner & Frances Robinson, EU Says Google Should Ex-
tend 'Right to be Forgotten' to '.com' Websites, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 2014, 10:59 am),
http://online.wsj.com/news/article-email; Article 29 Working Party, EUR. COMMISSION (Jun. 8,
2013), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/index-en.htm; Working Party,
Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment on
"Google Spain and Inc v. Agencia Espahiola de Protecci6n de Datos and Mario Costeja Gonz-
lez" C-131/12, WP 225 (Nov. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Article 29 Guidelines] (listing a "matrix" of
thirteen typical factors addressing the merits of delinking requests, some with sub-parts, and
none necessarily decisive).
8. Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 94; Article 29 Guidelines, supra note 7.
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operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general pub-
lic in finding that information upon a search relating to the data sub-
ject's name."9 Crucially, though,
that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular rea-
sons, such as the role played by the data subject in public life,
that the interference with his fundamental rights is justified
by the preponderant interest of the general public in having,
on account of inclusion in the list of results, access to the in-
formation in question.0
The language of fundamental rights is thus cashed out largely in
terms of a straightforward balancing test.1 In particular, the relevant
fair balancing may
depend, in specific cases, on the nature of the information in
question and its sensitivity for the data subject's private life
and on the interest of the public in having that information,
an interest which may vary, in particular, according to the
role played by the data subject in public life.12
Interest in a broad so-called right to be forgotten is not confined to
the European Union.1 3 Where it is eventually recognized, a presuma-
bly fundamental right to be forgotten may actually take different
forms, reflecting local cultural differences. The scope of coverage and
the strength of such a right are likely to vary as well. Already, the
European Union has at least for the moment categorically distin-
guished between the obligations of search engine operators and those
9. Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 97; see also id. TT 99-100.
10. Id. 797.
11. See id. 81.
12. Id.; see also id. 100. The result of such decisional balancing is then assumed to be ad-
ministratively and judicially enforceable. See id. 82.
13. See, e.g., Megumi Fujikawa, Google Suffers New Privacy Setback in Japan, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
14, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-suffers-new-privacy-setback-in-japan
-1412933523 (Tokyo District Court orders Google to remove search results regarding a man
claiming a privacy invasion involving alleged danger to his life, as well as physical and psycho-
logical illness); Privacy Rights for California Minors in the Digital World, CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 25580-25582 (West 2015) (requiring website operators to remove material posted by a
minor, though not by third parties, at the request of the minor); see also Edward Carter, Argen-
tina's Right to be Forgotten, 27 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 23, 24-25 (2013). But see Argentina: Search
Engines Are Not Liable Under Strict Liability Rules, DATA PRIVACY LAWS (Nov. 1, 2014),
www.dataprivacylaws.com.ar/2014/11/01/467/.
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of underlying third party governmental or privately owned web-
sites,14 including news aggregators.15 The proper strength of a funda-
mental right to be forgotten remains controversial even in official Eu-
ropean circles.16
Given the evolving nature of the right to be forgotten, the focus be-
low will not be on specific legal formulas, mechanisms, tests, or pro-
cedures. Instead, the focus will be on more basic underlying values,
concerns, tendencies, experiences, patterns, risks, and costs. Contro-
versial definitions of ideas such as privacy, autonomy, anonymity,
and the public interest will be avoided as much as possible. The focus
will instead be more practical. The argument below will rely not on
dogmatic assertions about rights, but on a pragmatic sense of the in-
evitable basic problems in implementing such a right.
In the end, for pragmatic reasons, there should not be an adoption
of a broad European-style legal right to be forgotten. Narrowly con-
textual particularized statutory and common law privacy, non-defa-
mation, confidentiality, and emotional distress damages rights -
along with criminal expungement statutes -jointly provide a better
alternative path. Narrowly focused holdings and statutes can readily
be modified to address significant socio-economic class effects.
Any broad-sweeping legal right to be forgotten, beyond such nar-
row, particularized, context-sensitive accommodations, is ultimately
likely, for practical reasons discussed throughout below, to be ill-ad-
vised. The superiority of a narrow, particularized, contextual, and
pluralistic approach to a right to be forgotten flows from practically
significant systematic biases and asymmetries between individuals
seeking delinking or deletion of personal information on the one
hand and information aggregators such as Google on the other. Some
preliminary background considerations bearing upon this ultimate
conclusion are introduced immediately below.
14. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 83 (distinguishing search engine sites from other, un-
derlying, substantive websites); Article 29 Guidelines, supra note 7.
15. One largely U.S.-oriented traffic ranking of news websites lists, in descending order: Ya-
hoo! News; Google News; HuffingtonPost; CNN; New York Times; Fox News; NBC News; Mail
Online; Washington Post; The Guardian; WSJ; ABCNews; BBC News; USA Today; and LA
Times. Top 15 Most Popular News Websites, EBIZMBA (Apr. 2015), http://www
.ebizmba.com/articles/news-websites. Of course, material arguably violating privacy rights
could be posted on a wide range of websites not thought of as news-oriented.
16. See Jennifer Baker, Europe Mulls Weaker 'Right to Be Forgotten' Google Rule, THE REGISTER
(Oct. 10, 2014, 5:27 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/10/10/eu-ministersgoogle
_right to-be forgotten watered-down/; Vaas, supra note 7.
[Vol. 7:401
THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
I. PRIVACY, ANONYMITY, AND A RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN:
BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS
One preliminary problem is that the test of judicial protection for a
right to be forgotten does not seem to match the dramatic rhetorical
characterization of the right. The right in question has been exalted as
a fundamental or human right.17 Yet the judicial test for upholding or
restricting the right to be forgotten thus far seems to involve pre-
sumptions and a broad weighing and balancing of arguably relevant
interests. 8 Could a genuinely fundamental right really be traded off
and overridden in this fashion?
A moment's reflection suggests, though, that rights we have long
thought genuinely fundamental can indeed, in various contexts, be
substantially limited in the name of the public interest. Consider, for
example, the constitutional protection of freedom of speech, and in
particular, speech on public streets and thoroughfares. The power of
government to restrict speech on public streets, a traditional forum
for public discussion," is said to be quite limited.2 ° The right to speak
in public streets is in this sense basic and well established.2
A look at the typical purposes of public streets also suggests, how-
ever, common sense limitations on the relevant free speech right. At
the very least, content neutral regulations of public street speech in
the interests of traffic flow, and of safely avoiding distractions, colli-
sions, hazards, and delays, may well be constitutionally permissible.'
The case of free speech in public streets thus suggests that we
should not assume a distinctive problem with a fundamental right to
be forgotten that can, in a broad range of contexts, be outweighed
17. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 81, 91, 97,99.
18. See generally id.
19. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2528-29 (2014); Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.
Ct. 1207, 1218 (2011); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 579
(1995); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1988); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180
(1983); Seattle Affiliate of the Oct. 22 Coal. to Stop Police Brutality v. City of Seattle, 550 F.3d
788, 796 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Street parades afford greater visibility to the marchers than parading
down the sidewalk, and may also allow marchers to proceed abreast, march behind a horizontal
banner, and more easily distribute materials to pedestrians on both sides of the street.").
20. See, e.g., McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529; Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.
21. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.
22. See, e.g., McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791 (1991)); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr, Inc., 512 U.S. 753,768 (1994); McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636,653-
54 (3d Cir. 2009); People v. Barton, 8 N.Y.3d 70, 78 (2006) (upholding regulation of the speech
of "individuals seeking handouts from occupants of motor vehicles on a public thoroughfare.
. thereby creating a hazard and slowing or snarling traffic.").
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merely by conflicting interests of general or particular sorts. If every-
thing else were to fall into place, a right to be forgotten, as currently
protected in Europe,' could by analogy still count as a genuinely fun-
damental right.
However, United States case law and statutory law do not, at least
for the present, support any such generic, broad-sweeping right to be
forgotten. The United States pattern is instead one of gradually accru-
ing, narrow, particularized, contextually sensitive protections of var-
ious loosely related rights, along with statutory protections of partic-
ular sorts, in their particular contexts. 4 If a formal label for this nar-
rower, more modest United States approach is absolutely necessary,
we could borrow the phrase "disjoint incrementalism." 2 Thus far,
United States' law has typically avoided European-style expansive,
comprehensive grand theory in this regard.
The high water mark of any relatively broad-sweeping United
States approach is the 1931 California Appellate Court decision in
Melvin v. Reid.26 The opinion in Melvin is exceptionally moralistic in
its language, rationale, and tone.27 The case involved a movie that re-
lied not merely on presumably scandalous prior incidents somehow
preserved in a public record, but on the defendant's use of the plain-
tiff-appellant's name in connection with those prior incidents, after
she had allegedly rehabilitated herself some eight years before the
movie in question.28 The Melvin court thus opined that
[t]he use of appellant's true name in connection with the in-
cidents of her life [involving prostitution] in the plot and ad-
vertisements was unnecessary and indelicate, and a willful
and wanton disregard of that charity which should actuate
us in our social intercourse, and which should keep us from
unnecessarily holding another up to ... scorn .29
23. See supra notes 1, 3 and accompanying text.
24. DAVID BRAYBROOKE & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION: POLICY EVALU-
ATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS ch. 5 (1970).
25. Id.; see also Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of"Mudding Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
79,81 (1959) (contrasting "Rational-Comprehensive (Root)" policy analysis methods with more
modest, narrower, incrementalist "Successive Limited Comparisons (Branch)"
methods).
26. 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
27. See generally id.
28. See id. at 91.
29. Id. at 93.
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In broad terms, the Melvin court declared that "[a]ny person living
a life of rectitude has that right to happiness which includes a free-
dom from unnecessary attacks on his character, social standing, or
reputation."" Only a bit more contextually, the Melvin court then
concluded that
the publication.. . of the unsavory incidents in the past life
of appellant after she had reformed, coupled with her true
name, was not justified by any standard of morals or ethics
known to us, and was a direct invasion of her inalienable
right guaranteed to her by our Constitution, to pursue and
obtain happiness. Whether we call this a right of privacy or
give it any other name is immaterial .... 31
It cannot be said with certainty whether the reasoning of Melvin
would extend to serious criminal activity, breaches of trust, public
figures, matters of public concern, more recent rehabilitations, or dif-
ferent means of dissemination, including government publications.
No issue of the completeness or incompleteness of the plaintiff's re-
habilitation arose in Melvin, as the case was decided on the basis of
the defendant's motion to dismiss.32 Based on the broad-sweeping
language in Melvin,33 one might imagine that most or all of these
above categories would indeed fall within the scope of
Melvin.
Interestingly, though, the court's own initial summary of the law
of privacy makes a case for excluding cases of public figures, 34 matters
of (continuing) public interest,35 matters of public record,36 oral state-






35. See id. Query whether the public figure versus private figure distinction should be ab-
sorbed into the more relevant, though often difficult, inquiry into whether the material in ques-
tion addresses a matter of public interest and concern. See sources cited infra, note 73.
36. See Melvin, 297 P. at 93. The public record versus privacy conflict was addressed in Cox
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) ("Public records by their very nature are of inter-
est to those concerned with the administration of government, and a public benefit is performed
by the reporting of the true contents of the records by the media."). See also Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989) (holding that Florida law that punished newspapers for printing sensi-
tive but publicly available information violated the First Amendment).
37. See Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 495.
38. As we shall see, a number of these considerations are often thought to be relevant to, if
not dispositive of, right to be forgotten cases. See infra Part II.
2015] 407
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States case law establishes that disowning one's prior public figure
status may not be practical in some cases, and more important for our
purposes, will often trigger a fact-sensitive, circumstance-based, con-
textual inquiry by the court.39 The passage of time, even along with
one's good faith efforts, may not suffice to change one's public figure
status, or the nature and weight of any public interest at stake.4 °
The themes of incrementalism, particularity, context, and circum-
stance are more useful in accounting for the scope and limits of the
most important contemporary United States privacy statutes. The al-
ready more or less contextualized federal Freedom of Information
Act,41 for example, itself has a number of further contextualized ex-
emptions,42 and these exemptions from disclosure are typically nar-
rowly construed.43 The narrow construction rule applies even to some
of the most privacy-focused Freedom of Information Act cases,44 if
less so to others,45 depending, again, upon circumstances and the
changing weight of the relevant contextualized interests.46 The simi-
larly contextualized Privacy Act of 1974 also involves numerous
39. See Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 807-09 (2d Cir. 1940) ("[elveryone will agree
that at some point the public interest in obtaining information becomes dominant over the in-
dividual's desire for privacy"). The Sidis court clearly engages in a contextualized inquiry. See
id. at 809. For philosophical explorations of some distinctive forms of contextualism and partic-
ularism in moral theory, see, respectively, MARK TIMMONS, MORALITY WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS:
A DEFENSE OF ETHICAL CONTEXTUALISM (2004); MORAL PARTICULARISM (Brad Hooker & Mar-
garet Olivia Little eds., 2001). On the Sidis case in particular, see Samantha Barbas, The Sidis
Case and the Origins of Modern Privacy Law, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 21 (2012).
40. See Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807-09; Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. New York Times, 842 F.2d
616, 619 (2d Cir. 1988); Mitre Sports Int'l, Ltd. v. Home Box Office, 22 F.Supp.3d 240, 251
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); Jones v. New Haven Register, Inc., 763 A.2d 1097, 1100 (2000) ("[t]he Supreme
Court of the United States has not yet decided 'whether or when an individual who was once a
public figure may lose that status by the passage of time'") (quoting Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 166 n.7 (1979)).
41. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009).
42. See id.
43. See Milner v. Dep't of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1265 (2011); Dep't of Interior v. Klamath
Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001); FBI v. Abrahmson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982);
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. United States, 746 F.3d 1082, 1088 (D.C.
Cir. 2014).
44. See FOIA Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), recognizing relevant public interests and
adopting a "clearly unwarranted" invasion of personal privacy standard; see, e.g., Yonemoto v.
Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 686 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing Freedom of Information Act
exemptions).
45. See FOIA Exemption 7(c), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(c), adopting an expansive "unwarranted
invasion" of privacy standard regarding law enforcement records access; see, e.g., Nat'l Archives
& Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2003) (" [t]he term 'unwarranted' requires us to
balance the family's privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure"); Dep't of Justice
v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
46. See sources cited supra note 45.
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thoughtful exemptions, beyond its limited scope of application only
to most federal governmental agencies.47
At the state level, the various arrest and conviction expungement
statutes seek - again within discrete, particular, limited contexts - to
accommodate certain narrow privacy interests.' Expungement stat-
utes promote relatively limited privacy interests in limited contexts,
and they can clearly be modified in the future to be more socio-eco-
nomically just in their impact. United States courts have been unwill-
ing to read anything like a European-style general right to be forgot-
ten into typical criminal expungement statutes.49 As a leading case
concluded, "[a]lthough our expungement statute generally permits a
person whose record has been expunged to misrepresent his past, it
does not alter the metaphysical truth of his past, nor does it impose a
regime of silence on those who know the truth."5" Doubtless web
pages, posts, and search engine results are more cheaply and unde-
tectably revised than are items in paper archives and bound volumes.
But as the court in question crucially observed, expungement statutes
are "not intended to create an Orwellian scheme, whereby previously
published information -long maintained in official records-now
becomes beyond the reach of public discourse on penalty of a defa-
mation [or privacy] action."5
On the basis of these background considerations, then, let us con-
sider some of the crucial issues associated with a purported right to
47. See Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(a)(8)(B), (a)(8)(j-k)). For
an analogously relatively limited, qualified, and nuanced student record privacy statute in an-
other discrete context, see the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
90-247, 88 Stat. 571 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g et seq.); see also Owasso Indep. School Dist. v.
Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002) (construing the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974).
For statutory privacy rights and exemptions in yet another comparatively discrete context, see
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.).
48. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.0585 (West 2014) (specifying the discrete scope of coverage
and exceptions). For convenient access to a broader range of state expungement statutes, see
Expungement and Criminal Records: State-Specific Information, FINDLAW, http://criminal
.findlaw.com/expungement/expungement-and-criminal-records-state-specific-information
.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).
49. See generally, Expungement and Criminal Records: State-Specific Information, supra note 48.
50. G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300,316 (N.J. 2011).
51. Id. at 319 (same result under "false light" claim). For further discussion, see Martin v.
Hearst Corp., No. 3:12CV1023(MPS), 2013 WL 5310165, at *6 (D. Conn. Aug. 5, 2013). For the
Orwellian "memory hole" reference, see for example, Catherine Rampell, America: The Land of
No Second Chance, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
opinion/commentary/ct-secnd-chances-for-eites-only-perspec-196-20141105-story.html
(raising the question of the effects of a broad right to be forgotten on different socio-economic
classes).
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be forgotten, not primarily at the level of competing definitions and
the abstract clash of rights, and interests, but at a more pragmatic,
investigative, realistic, operational level.
II. SOME IMPORTANT PRAGMATIC CONCERNS IN RIGHT TO BE
FORGOTTEN CONTEXTS
In some fields of study, carefully defining relevant terms and sys-
tematically analyzing those terms and their relationships yields sub-
stantial advances in understanding. 2 Unfortunately, in the general
context of a purported legal right to be forgotten, this is not likely to
be the case. Conceptual analysis, short of a more pragmatic investiga-
tion informed by sensible judgments, will only carry us so far.
While privacy rights are often considered fundamental,53 the idea
of privacy itself has proven to be not merely controversial, but endur-
ingly elusive.' To illustrate some remarkably basic conceptual uncer-
tainties, consider the claim that:
the more one thinks about privacy, the less confident one can
be that privacy is a distinctly moral desideratum, as opposed
to a largely prudential one, when it is anything more than a
matter of a widely shared taste. ... [Olur interest in privacy
is mainly a matter of taste and prudence.55
In contrast, the idea of anonymity is used in fewer divergent senses
than that of privacy, but it does not seem to be of consistently posi-
tive - let alone overridingly positive - value. One scholar argues that
anonymity "is not reducible to privacy, liberty and autonomy, secu-
rity, or secrecy, but is distinguished from them by its hallmark trait
of dissociability."56 Dissociability, in turn, involves the morally am-
biguous ability to prevent others from knowing us as we really are,5 7
and naturally inspires in us a certain ambivalence. While anonymity
52. See, e.g., Euclid, Elements (Dana Densmore ed., Thomas L. Heath trans., Green Lion Press
2002) (300 B.C.).
53. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1153 (2004).
54. See id. at 1153 ("honest advocates of privacy protections are forced to admit that the con-
cept of privacy is embarrassingly difficult to define") (citing, inter alia Wililiam M. Beaney, The
Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 255 (1966)); Robert C. Post,
Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087 (2001).
55. Alexander Rosenberg, As a Matter of Taste and Right, in THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 68, 68 (El-
len Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller & Jeffrey Paul eds., 2000).
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can certainly allow us "to protect ourselves in morally permissible
ways,""8 as in the case of Alcoholics Anonymous membership, 59 it
also "permits a range of moral vices, for it also shields us from ac-
countability for wrongdoing."' We naturally have a similar ambiva-
lence about the related idea of concealment. Concealment involves,
often positively, "reticence and nonacknowledgement,"61 as well as,
and often more negatively, manipulation, and "secrecy and
deception."62
Our understandable ambivalence as to the value of anonymity,
self-concealment, and privacy more generally,63 is however, ulti-
mately based less in definitional and conceptual issues than in im-
portant pragmatic concerns and experiences. 64 Mere assertion of a
right to privacy "may prevail for a time, but only so long as the ben-
efits that it opposes are small."65 The most decisive considerations for
and against any supposed right to be forgotten are thus, in the long
run, more likely to be of a pragmatic, experiential character.
58. Steve Matthews, Anonymity and the Social Self, 47 AM. PHIL. Q. 351,352 (2010). It has anal-
ogously been argued that privacy in general "is an essential part of human flourishing or well-
being." Adam D. Moore, Privacy: Its Meaning and Value, 40 AM. PHIL. Q. 215,223 (2003).
59. See Matthews, supra note 58, at 352.
60. Id.
61. Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 4 (1998); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE chs. 9-10 (2007) (discussing privacy as being left alone ver-
sus privacy as enhancing opportunities for self-interested manipulation and selective disclo-
sure); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 395 (1978) (" [Slocial, like busi-
ness, dealings present opportunities for exploitation through misrepresentation"); David Fried-
man, Privacy and Technology, in THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, supra note 55, at 189 n.5 (noting that
borrowers with no past bankruptcies will be better off with weak or effectively waivable pri-
vacy and non-disclosure rights).
62. Nagel, supra note 61, at 4.
63. See R. George Wright, Some Reasons For Our Ambivalence About the Value of Privacy, 22
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 45 (2013) and the surveys cited therein. For a snapshot of United States pop-
ular ambivalence as to more specific dimensions of privacy, including the removal of links or
online posts and the freedom of speech or of the press, along with grounds and rationales, see
H.O. Maycotte, 'America's Right to Be Forgotten' Fight Heats Up, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2014, 9:51 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/homaycotte/2014/ 09/30/americas-right-to-be-forgotten
-fight-heats-up/.
64. See, e.g., Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Right to Privacy, in THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, supra note 55,
at 44.
65. Id. Thus, "those who would defend privacy as we know it will have to provide a con-
vincing account of the human good that overshadows the material rewards that are offered in
its place. It will not be easy." Id. We should clarify that there is no reason to believe that all of
the pragmatic costs of pursuing a right to be forgotten will be material or financial in character.
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At a pragmatic level, our attitudes toward the value of remember-
ing and forgetting particular life incidents are mixed.66 We enjoy in-
spiring stories of those persons who capitalize on an unexpected sec-
ond chance.67 But we also value the opportunity to meaningfully in-
form ourselves about strangers upon whom we might wish to rely,68
including via a convenient and inexpensive search of internet rec-
ords.69 The practical value of such internet records reflects not only
their accuracy, but their realistic thoroughness and availability. Some
intentional deletions, after all, could unexpectedly turn out to be de-
ceptive, misleading,7" and costly to perhaps unforeseen
persons.7
The problem of the costs to various other persons of a right to be
forgotten remains important. This is true even if the entities making
a removal decision take seriously the distinctions between currently
relevant information, irrelevant information, or supposedly outdated
information, and between matters of ongoing public interest and
those that do not thus qualify.72 As a leading expert rightly observed,
"the concepts of relevance and of public interest [are] both very
slippery."73
66. The great novelist and short story writer Jorge Luis Borges points out that at the level of
the individual most directly concerned, literal forgetting is necessary for meaningful thought.
See Jorge Luis Borges, Funes the Memorious, available at www.srs-pr.com/
literature/borges-funes.pdf; see also ANNE GALLOWAY, COLLECTIVE REMEMBERING AND THE IM-
PORTANCE OF FORGETTING: A CRITICAL DESIGN CHALLENGE (2006), available at http://purselip-
squarejaw.org/papers/galloway-chi2006.pdf (citing Jorge Luis Borges, Funes the Memorious).
Memories and meanings from the past may also be excessively discounted, rather than dis-
counted insufficiently. See DAVID GROSS, LOST TIME: ON REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING IN
LATE MODERN CULTURE 152 (2000).
67. See, e.g., MICHAEL G. SANTOS, EARNING FREEDOM: CONQUERING A 45 YEAR PRISON TERM
(2013).
68. See generally, REPUTATION.COM, www.reputation.com/reputationdefender (last visited
Mar. 31, 2015) (promoting programs for reputation control).
69. See id.; see also Whitney Hackathorne, Speak Now or Forever Hold Your Tweets, THE HARRIS
POLL (June 3, 2010), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/
447/mid/1508/articleld/403/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/Default.aspx.
70. See ITT Cont'l Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 1976) (discussing deception
and misleading in the Federal Trade Commission regulatory context).
71. See sources cited supra note 61.
72. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos, Mario
Costeja Gonzalez, (May 13, 2014), available at http://curia.europa.eu (citing Council Directive
95/46, arts. 2, 4, 7-9, 14, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC) 81, 85, 92-94, 97 (May 13, 2014), available at
http://curia.europa.eu).
73. Luciano Floridi, Google's Privacy Ethics Tour of Europe: A Complex Balancing Act, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2014) http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/sep/16/googles
-european-privacy-ethics-tour; see also LUCIANO FLORIDI, THE FOURTH REVOLUTION: HOW THE
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Consider, for example, the inevitable difficulties in trying to assess
the continuing relevance of some assumedly accurate item of infor-
mation. To even begin to guess about such questions, the decision
maker would need to know something of the particular contexts and
circumstances in which the information in question might, in the fu-
ture, be sought. Such matters are typically not entirely known even
to the party requesting the deletion of the link or web posting in ques-
tion. The relevant insights, of whatever quality, are instead widely
dispersed across time and space, and among many parties,74 most of
whom will have no notice of the removal request and costly alterna-
tive access, if any, to the removed information.75
INFOSPHERE Is RESHAPING HUMAN REALITY ch. 5 (2014) (extending treatment of the social impli-
cations of emerging information technologies). For a sense of the difficulties in managing the
distinction between public interests and merely private interests in some related contexts, see
Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters ofPublic Con-
cern, 64 IND. L.J. 43,45, 47,54 (1988); Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters ofPublic Concern: The
Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1990); Robert C.
Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation,
and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 615 (1990); Mark Strasser, Vat's It to
You: The First Amendment and Matters of Public Concern, 77 Mo. L. REV. 1083, 1086-89 (2012); R.
George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 27, 29-30
(1987).
74. For the standard discussion of the broad diffusion of relevant present knowledge
throughout much of the community, see Friedrich August von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in
Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1945) ("the knowledge of the circumstances of which we
must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits
of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals pos-
sess."); see also Friedrich August von Hayek, The Pretence of Knowledge, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 3, 7
(1974).
75. Some search engines, including Google, may controversially provide some limited no-
tice that otherwise includable search results have been omitted due to privacy law concerns, see
for example, Roberta Holland, Court Data Ruling Causing Host of Compliance Issues, COMPLIANCE
WEEK (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/global-glimpses/
court-data-ruling-causing-host-of-compliance-issues; Schechner & Robinson, supra note 7 (de-
scribing official EU view of routine deletion notifications as potentially undermining the effec-
tiveness of the right's implementation). Some websites, including that of the BBC, may then
choose to post a list of their own articles subjected to delinking, as they are informed of such
delinkings by Google. See, e.g., Dave Lee, BBC to Publish 'Right to Be Forgotten' Removals List, BBC
NEWS (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-29658085. If a market for de-
leted results or underlying web pages, posts, or articles develops, we can expect search engines
and specialized websites to respond. See Claire Cain Miller, It's Not as Simple as Asking to 'Be
Forgotten' by Google, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
05/27/ upshot/its-not-as-simple-as-asking-to-be-forgotten-by-google.htrl. There has already
been some limited movement in this direction. See, e.g., HIDDEN FROM GOOGLE, http://hidden-
fromgoogle.afaqtariq.com/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2015); Caitlin Dewey, The Web Site that Remem-
bers Things Google Forgot, WASH. POST (July 16, 2014), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/ news/ the-intersect/ wp/ 2014/ 07/16/ the-web-site-that-remembers
-things-google-forgot/; see also, ARE THEY SAFE, http://aretheysafe.co.uk (last visited Apr. 23,
2015) (offering background checks among the available services in the United Kingdom). Any
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The crucial problem, though, is not that the information provided
by anyone requesting delinking or deletion will commonly be merely
"incomplete."76 That is both inevitable and often subject, at one level
or another, to reasonable contest and debate.77 The more significant
problem is that removal and delinking decisions affecting those
partly unpredictable future circumstances will commonly be made at
the request of an exceptionally interested party, whose version of the
relevant circumstances will typically be unchallenged by knowledge-
able persons, if not simply presented ex parte.78 The potential for sys-
tematic bias and distortions of various sorts in largely ex parte
presentations with obvious and substantial information asymmetries
is clear.79
The largely ex parte nature of most deletion requests, in which the
personally incentivized requester has both greater information access
and strong self-interest considerations, is not the only relevant asym-
metry."0 Consider the rare deletion requests that proceed to some
higher administrative or even judicial level. The majority of such re-
quests will presumably be appeals of a denied deletion request. Lack
of symmetry in taking the initiative will thus be built into the appeals
practical limits on the geographic or jurisdictional scope of privacy laws and decisions may of
course impair their enforceability.
76. See EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, Eu DATA PROTEcTION LAW: A 'RIGHT TO BE FORGOT-
TEN?' Second Report, 2014-15, H.L. 40 at 11, available at http://www.publications
.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/40/40.pdf.
77. See sources cited infra note 73; see also Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Manage-
ment and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1881 (2013) ("It is virtually impossible for
people to weigh the costs and benefits of revealing information.., without an understanding
of the potential downstream uses ... ").
78. See, e.g., Agence Fr. Presse, Google Is Having Trouble Determining the Legitimacy of Europe's
91,000 'Right to Be Forgotten' Requests, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 1, 2014, 6:31 AM), http://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/google-is-having-trouble-determining-the-legitimacy-of
-europes-91000-right-to-be-forgotten-requests-2014-8 ("Even if requesters provide us with ac-
curate information, they understandably may avoid presenting facts that are not in their
favor.").
79. Consider for example, the case of a removal request by someone who is known by local
insiders to be an ambitious likely future candidate for office. See Nancy Scola, Designing 'The
Right to Be Forgotten,' WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/08/04/designing-the-right-to-be-forgotten/ (also noting, paren-
thetically, that compliance costs may disproportionately burden emerging or start-up technol-
ogies, thereby amounting to a legal barrier to entry by new competitors). For some theoretical
background on the importance of information asymmetries more broadly, see generally George
A. Akerlof, The Market For "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON.
488 (1970). Socially harmful information asymmetries can often be reduced by the free and open
use of the internet. For an introduction, see STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER,
FREAKONOMIcS 61-62 (2006).
80. See LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 79, at 61-64.
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system. In most cases, if no broader principle is at stake, the realistic
financial incentives of the parties are likely to be asymmetric as well,
especially where the requester, but not the search engine owners,
seeks money damages or attorneys' fees.
Information that has been publicly available on the internet is both
more easily removed, and at the same time, paradoxically, often
harder to entirely remove,81 as opposed to former technologies. 2 We
naturally identify and sympathize with those persons who continue
to suffer the consequences of prior indiscretions, or even non-culpa-
ble acts and associations. But broad-sweeping legal rules and regimes
in this area, even if they encourage some form of attempted interest
balancing, are nevertheless ill-advised.
A broad interest balancing approach at least recognizes that "peo-
ple's decisions about their own privacy affect society, not just them-
selves."83 Ideally, though, privacy decision makers should not confine
themselves to holding a mental picture of a living, breathing personal
requester against a merely faceless, disembodied, unsympathetic, ab-
stract "society." Societal interests must indeed be considered, in the
best available ways. But it is also useful to at least try to think con-
cretely and particularly of those now anonymous, faceless persons
who might, at some point in the future, unfairly suffer from the una-
vailability, or from the availability only at a high cost, of the deleted
information.84
Nor, as alluded to above, 5 can we count on the more or less good
faith judgment of those persons who are motivated to seek a deletion
or delinking. We should instead expect systematic, though unin-
tended, biases in such requests and presentations. This is not primar-
ily a matter of conscious deception by requesters, but of familiar psy-
chological overall tendencies and patterns in broad populations.
81. See sources cited supra note 74; Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 88, 88, available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/
online/topics/64-SLRO-88.pdf ("It is very hard to escape your past on the Internet now that
every photo, status update, and tweet lives forever in the cloud."). Note the possible long-term
cultural spur to developing early the classical Aristotelian virtue of prudence. See infra note 91.
82. Consider, anecdotally, that East German decisions to pulp books on political grounds
did not necessarily preclude the publication of West German editions of the same books. See
ROBERT DARNTON, CENSORS AT WORK: How STATES SHAPED LITERATURE 217-18 (2014).
83. Solove, supra note 77, at 1881.
84. Any decision-making process that contrasts an identified present person with the vague
interests of abstract society risks systematic bias through our common misuse of what are called
availability heuristics. For the relevant pioneering work, see generally Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic For Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
207 (1973).
85. See supra note 78.
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Consider, to begin with, Nietzsche's aphorism serving as the epi-
gram above: "'I have done that,' says my memory. 'I cannot have
done that,' says my pride, and remains inexorable."16 Alternatively,
but equally relevant to our context, consider Adam Smith's observa-
tion that "[i]t is so disagreeable to think ill of ourselves that we often
purposely turn away our view from those circumstances which might
render that judgment unfavorable.""7
One leading contemporary privacy theorist has publicly wondered
whether interest in a broad right to be forgotten "may be a sign that
we are tired of confronting our past mistakes and responsibilities." 8
Contemporary social science would suggest that typically, we are not
far removed from self-serving,89 if not self-deluded, attitudes.9" The
desire, however, to erase negative elements of our public past is often
more understandable than fully justified.
The tendency to be systematically biased judges in our own case
seems pervasive and well-established.91 This poses h distinctively se-
vere problem for broad, and largely ex parte, right to be forgotten
statutes and other broad privacy rules. The problem exists whether
86. See supra note ** and accompanying text.
87. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS pt. III, ch. 4, 4 (David D. Raphael &
Alec L. Macfie eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1790) (quoted in Harvey Mitchell, "The Mysterious
Veil of Self-Delusion" in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, 20 AM. SOC'Y EIGHTEENTH-CEN-
TURY STUD. 405, 405 (1987)) (discussing the common tendency toward self-deception).
88. Floridi, supra note 73.
89. See LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAXIMS NO. 2, at 37 (Leonard Tancock trans., Penguin 1959)
(1665) (" [s]elf-love is the greatest flatterer of all"); see also id. NO. 56, at 44 (" [i]n order to succeed
in the world people do their utmost to appear successful").
90. See, e.g., William von Hippel & Robert Trivers, The Evolution and Psychology of Self-Decep-
tion, 34 BEHAV. & BRAIN SC. 1 (2011) (discussing the evolutionary survival and selection ad-
vantages of some capacities for (self-serving) self-delusion, especially as communicated to other
persons).
91. See ARISTOTLE, EUDEMIAN ETHICS bk. II ch. 5, at 22 (Anthony Kenny trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 2011) ("our nature from the outset is not in every case equidistant from the mean; we are
... excessively keen on self-indulgence"); see also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. III ch.
2, at 74 (Christopher Rowe trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (1893) ("self-indulgence would seem
to be justly a matter of reproach"). For some possible social implications, see the discussion in
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 13, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). By way of contrast, consider that the dystopian
ruler Mustapha Mond exalts "[s]elf-indulgence up to the very limits imposed by hygiene and
economics. Otherwise the wheels stop turning." ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 237 (Har-
court Perennial Modem Classics 1998) (1932). For an expression of concern as to the likely char-
acter of professional or willing official censors, see John Milton, Areopagitica, Speech to the
Parlament of England (1644), available at https://www.dartmouth
.edu/ -milton/reading-room/areopagitica/ text.shtml.
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or not the incidences of self-indulgence and self-absorption are wors-
ening over time.9 2 For our purposes, any form and degree of narcis-
sism," as well as any sense of personal entitlement,' may reinforce
what is professionally known as attribution bias and an arbitrary
minimization of personal responsibility. 95 Attribution bias simply re-
fers to the idea that "[p]eople are more likely to attribute positive
events to themselves but dismiss negative events as attributable to
other causes."96
Nor can people -including those seeking removal of personal in-
formation from the internet -be counted on to recognize their own
self-serving biases regarding the causes, consequences, and possible
continuing relevance of their prior acts. Generally, people are better
at detecting self-serving attributional bias in other persons -when
they have sufficient unbiased information to do so -than they are in
92. See Claude Fischer, Are We More Self-Absorbed Than Previous Generations, Or Just More
Self-Aware?, THE BERKELEY BLOG (June 26, 2014), http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2014/O6/26/are
-we-more-self-absorbed-than-previous-generations-or-more-self-aware/.
93. See JEAN M. TWENGE & W. KEITH CAMPBELL, THE NARCISSISM EPIDEMIC: LIVING IN THE
AGE OF ENTITLEMENT 283 (2009) ("[t]rue humility is a strength: the ability to see or evaluate
yourself accurately and without defensiveness"); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NAR-
CISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS 13-16 (rev. ed., 1991); Jean M.
Twenge & Joshua D. Foster, Birth Cohort Increases in Narcissistic Personality Traits Among Ameri-
can College Students, 1982-2009, 1 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 99, 100 (2010). For a con-
flicting analysis as to whether some forms of narcissism are becoming more common or more
severe over time, see generally Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, The Evidence for Generation We and Against
Generation Me, 1 EMERGING ADULTHOOD 5 (2013).
94. See, e.g., JEAN M. TWENGE, GENERATION ME: WHY TODAY'S YOUNG AMERICANS ARE MORE
CONFIDENT, ASSERTIVE, ENTITLED - AND MORE MISERABLE THAN EVER BEFORE (2006); W. Keith
Campbell, et al., Psychological Entitlement: Interpersonal Consequences and Validation of a Self-Re-
spect Measure, 83 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 29, 29 (2004) ("[p]sychological entitlement has a
pervasive and largely unconstructive impact on social behavior"); Lauren N. Pryor, et al., A
Comparison of the Psychological Entitlement Scale and the Narcissistic Personality Inventory's Entitle-
ment Scale: Relations With General Personality Traits and Personality Disorders, J. OF PERSONALITY
ASSESSMENT 517, 517 (2008) (entitlement as a dimension of both narcissistic personality disorder
and trait narcissism).
95. Amy H. Mezulis, et al., Is There a Universal Positivity Bias in Attributions? A Meta-Analytic
Review of Individual, Developmental, and Cultural Differences in the Self-Serving Attributional Bias,
130 PSYCHOL. BULL. 711, 711 (2004); see also Martin D. Coleman, Emotion and the Self-Serving Bias,
30 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY 345, 345 (2011) ("[t]he self-serving bias is revealed in the behavioral
tendency to take credit for personal success but to deny responsibility for personal failure"
which protects self-esteem); Miron Zuckerman, Attribution of Success and Failure Revisited, Or:
The Motivational Bias Is Alive and Well in Attribution Theory, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
245 (1979).
96. Mezulis, supra note 95, at 711.
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the case of their own judgments.97 As several experts have jointly con-
cluded, "people readily detect or infer a wide variety of biases in oth-
ers while denying such biases in themselves."9"
These attributional biases thus jointly operate to systemically skew
our own sense of responsibility for our own past actions. Again, the
argument is not that these biases have been historically increasing.
Instead, the argument is that such biases tend to outweigh any coun-
ter-biases tending in the opposing direction. If we then think of what
we have done as largely externally controlled or otherwise, 99 on any
imaginable theory, not fully our own responsibility, 100 we may more
uninhibitedly seek removal of unfavorable information, and the sto-
ries we tell about our prior acts may also reflect these biases.
The biases energizing us to obscure unfavorable elements of our
past and to shade their telling to others are linked to a superficial kind
of self-forgiveness.1"' But there is also a deeper and more valuable sort
of self-forgiveness that is instead linked to the appropriate acceptance
of responsibility, rather than to its denial or minimization.10 2 This
deeper sort of self-forgiveness requires that we acknowledge and ac-
cept genuinely appropriate responsibility, rather than deny, contest,
97. See generally Emily Pronin, Thomas Gilovich & Lee Ross, Objectivity in the Eye of the Be-
holder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 781 (2004) [here-
inafter Pronin, Objectivity]; Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin & Lee Ross, The Bias Blind Spot: Percep-
tions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 369 (2002); Emily
Pronin, How We See Ourselves and How We See Others, 320 SCI. 1177, 1179 (2008).
98. Pronin, Objectivity, supra note 97, at 781.
99. See generally Julian B. Rotter, Internal Versus External Locus of Control of Reinforcement: A
Case History of a Variable, 45 AM. PSYCHOL. 489 (1990) (discussing expectancies of internal versus
external control of reinforcement); Julian B. Rotter, Some Problems and Misconceptions Related to
the Construct of Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcement, 43 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 56 (1975) (discussing internal versus external control of reinforcement as a personality
variable); Julian B. Rotter, Generalized Expectancies for Internal Versus External Control of Reinforce-
ment, 80 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS: GENERAL & APPLIED 1 (1966) (summarizing experiments that
examine group differences based on whether reinforcement was seen as internal or external).
100. For merely one kind of impulse toward a denial of one's personal responsibility, see
Patrick Gosling, Maxime Denizeau & Dominique Oberle, Denial of Responsibility: A New Mode of
Dissonance Reduction, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 722, 730 (2006) ("We believe that de-
nial of responsibility reduces dissonance through a mechanism of disengagement from one's
own behavior."). More broadly, more controversially, and more speculatively, see Joseph Ep-
stein, The Perpetual Adolescent, WEEKLY STANDARD (March 15, 2004), http://www
.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/825grtdi.asp.
101. See Peter Strelan, Who Forgives Others, Themselves, and Situations? The Roles of Narcissism,
Guilt, Self-Esteem, and Agreeableness, 42 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 259, 259-60
(2007).
102. See id. at 260 ("[t]aking responsibility is a key aspect of self-forgiveness, distinguishing
it from the related process of the self-serving bias, where individuals take responsibility for
positive outcomes but not negative outcomes").
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minimize, or evade such responsibility. 3 This personal acceptance
should encompass not merely the unfavorable event itself, but the
record of the event as available to the public, as well as one's own
relevant conduct after the fact.
Encouraging realistic attitudes toward one's own past actions and
other outcomes is generally in the public interest. But, the socially
valuable maturity and integrity manifested in such attitudes suggests
the ways in which the person most immediately concerned may also
be genuinely better off, morally or practically, as well."° A number of
the classic philosophers have gone so far as to disdain any concern
for one's broad public reputation, as distinct from one's actual under-
lying virtues.1"5
It is of course difficult to say what price persons generally pay,
fairly or unfairly, in practical terms when only our recommended nar-
rower, particularized, contextual legal remedies are available for
what persons take to be reputational harms. Persons are clearly some-
times capable of change over time, whether as a matter of character,
or of circumstance. I0 6 Some sort of collective acknowledgement and
legal accommodation of this possibility of favorable change certainly
seems both familiar and appropriate." 7
103. See, e.g., Julie H. Hall & Frank D. Fincham, Self-Forgiveness: The Stepchild of Forgiveness
Research, 24 J. Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 621, 622 (2005) (genuine self-forgiveness as becoming
"decreasingly motivated to avoid stimuli associated with the offense," and in our cases, more
broadly, the underlying unfavorable event and its report).
104. See id. Consider, in particular, the eventual forthrightness of Jean Valjean: "From what
motive ... did this convict come and say: I am convict? ... The motive is strange. It is from
honor." VICTOR HUGO, LES MISERABLES 1394 (Lee Fahnestock & Norman MacAfee trans., Signet
1987) (1862).
105. See, e.g., PLATO, EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO (F.J. Church trans., Pearson 1987) (-399
B.C.); EPICrETUs, THE ENCHIRIDION § xxxiii, at 32 (Thomas W. Higginson trans., Bobbs-Merrill
1948) (-140) ("If anyone ... speaks ill of you, do not make excuses ... but answer: 'He was
ignorant of my other faults, else he would not have mentioned these alone."'); MARCUS AURE-
LIUS, MEDITATIONS book 4, § 3, at 64 (Maxwell Staniforth trans., Penguin 1964) (-167) ("[hle who
ignores what his neighbor is... thinking, and cares only that his own actions should be just and
godly, is greatly the gainer in time and ease"); BOETHIUS, THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY ch.
4, at 13 (P.G. Walsh trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (-524) (initially lamenting his loss of repu-
tation).
106. See, e.g., Dawinder Sidhu, We Don't Need a "Right to Be Forgotten." We Need a Right to
Evolve, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120181/america
-shouldnt-even-need-right-be-forgotten.
107. See id. (endorsing a non-legally enforceable social norm favoring a "right to a dynamic
identity"). For a brief articulation of a more extreme view minimizing the role of distinctive,
stable, robust, character traits, see Gilbert Harman, The Nonexistence of Character Traits, PRINCE-
TON UNIVERSITY (Sept. 6. 2002), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-harman/
Papers/ Virresp.html.
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The broader public, however, also has some grounds for not casu-
ally assuming nearly universal or dramatic character change for the
better as person's age. One scholar has argued:
personality is ... relatively enduring over time. In fact, the
levels of consistency in personality traits are... higher than
phenomena such as income, blood pressure, and cholesterol
levels, and substantially higher than psychological ideas
such as happiness and self-esteem." 8
It remains true that however small the magnitude of the change, 10 9
people can indeed become more responsible, more caring, and more
conscientious, particularly as they enter and transition through adult-
hood."1 ° These results accord with the popular view that adolescents
may "settle down," mature, and take on responsibility as they move
into and through adulthood. The social science evidence suggests that
we do tend to be reasonably realistic about the likely direction of
change in other people's personality over time and tend to be logical
about discounting their earlier behaviors to at least some degree."'
Finally, consider some of the most practical dimensions of the dis-
tinct further problem of paternalism. A broad, murky rule mandating
a right to be forgotten of one sort or another would in a real sense
count as paternalistic."1 2 Of course, to the extent that such a broad
108. Brent Roberts, Personality Continuity and Change, PSYCHOLOGY TIMES (Winter, 2010),
available at http://www.psychology.illinois.edu/alumni/news/newsletter/documents/
PsychTimesWinter2010.pdf.
109. See, e.g., Avshalom Caspi & Brent W. Roberts, Personality Development Across the Life
Course: The Argument for Change and Continuity, 12 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 49, 61 (2001).
110. See id.; Dan P. McAdams & Bradley D. Olson, Personality Development: Continuity and
Change Over the Life Course, 61 ANNUAL REV. PSYCHOL. 517, 532 (2010); Brent W. Roberts et al.,
Patterns of Mean-Level Change in Personality Traits Across the Life Course: A Meta-Analysis of Lon-
gitudinal Studies, 132 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 2 (2006).
111. See Nick Haslam et al., Beliefs About Personality Change and Continuity, 42 PERSONALITY
AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1621, 1628 (2007) (concluding that the study "participants' beliefs
about the direction of normative adult personality change were reasonably accurate"); see also
Anne E. Wilson & Michael Ross, From Chump to Champ: People's Appraisals of their Earlier and
Present Selves, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 572, 583 (2001) ("people possess implicit the-
ories concerning the mutability of traits. They view some personal characteristics as readily
changeable and others as stable" (presumably setting aside the effects of changes in circum-
stances)) (internal citation omitted).
112. For useful background, see generally JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF (1989); JOEL FEIN-
BERG, PATERNALISM (Roll Sartorius ed., 1984); JOEL FEINBERG, PATERNALISM: THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2013); Emma C. Bullock, A Normatively Neutral
Definition of Paternalism, 65 PHIL. Q. 1 (2014); Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, STANFORD ENCYCLO-
PEDIA PHIL. (Nov. 6, 2002 rev. ed. June 4, 2014), http://plato.stanford
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right to be forgotten is intended to prevent our imposing unjust
harms on other persons by our irrationally failing to discount their
past actions, the rule would in that sense not count as paternalistic. In
a broader sense though, a right to be forgotten is intended to affect
our choices as to whom we associate with, not by providing more in-
formation, or through uncontroversial explanation of information,
but by depriving us of information, or by raising our costs of obtain-
ing information, based on official fears that we would misinterpret or
attach too much weight to that assumedly true information."3 This is
not an attractive public policy path. In other speech contexts, cer-
tainly, the Supreme Court has appreciated the controversy of depriv-
ing competent adults of accurate data when making commercial and
personal decisions affecting other persons."'
One might argue to the contrary that the continuing internet acces-
sibility, 15 of say a report of a decade-old bankruptcy liquidation,116
amounts to misleading speech,17 and as misleading speech, it is
properly subject to official delinking or deletion, whether paternalis-
tically or not. But it is far from clear that such a report should now
count as misleading on the grounds that the debtor's circumstances
or character might well have changed in the intervening decade. As
we have seen, competent adults typically recognize the possibility of
maturation,18 as well as, quite obviously, of relevant change of cir-
cumstance. To refuse credit, say, to a now objectively creditworthy
.edu/entries/ paternalism. For an unusually forthright defense of paternalism in particular cir-
cumstances, see SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM
(2013).
113. See sources cited supra note 112. This is presumably true in the case of information that
is somehow deemed to be irrelevant to our assumed purposes, or obsolete. See supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (quoting Va.
Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)); Thompson v. West-
ern States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357,375 (2002); Riley v. Nat'l Fed. of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 790-
91 (1988); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1987).
115. Realistically, there is of course a practical difference between convenient and nearly
universal internet accessibility, and the merely formal accessibility of unique local paper rec-
ords, or computer files open only to authorized personnel.
116. Cf. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos, Mario
Costeja Gonzalez (May 13, 2014), available at http://curia.europa.eu (citing Council Directive
95/46, arts. 2,4, 7-9, 14,1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC)).
117. See ITT Cont'l. Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207, 207 (2d Cir. 1976) (determining whether
product advertisements for Wonder Bread were misleading).
118. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. When all else is, or appears to be, entirely
equal, some persons might systematically prefer to trust someone with no bankruptcy over
someone with a stale bankruptcy experience. Persons with arguably stale adverse experiences,
though, need not passively assume that all else must remain perpetually equal. To complicate
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person, is to leave money on the table, and to thereby invite one's
competitors to take advantage of our own irrationality.
Further, an accurately dated but arguably stale bankruptcy report
is clearly not misleading in the sense that, say, a carrot seller's trium-
phant claim that her particular carrots are cholesterol-free would
be.119 The decision makers in right to be forgotten cases will inevitably
face an endless succession of assertions that a particular representa-
tion is now misleading, for whatever purposes might be imaginable
or actually imagined, across the broadest range of specific circum-
stances. Such a succession of speculative cases would also require the
decision makers to somehow classify the allegedly misleading inter-
net speech at issue as either commercial speech or non-commercial
speech,12° assuming that misleading commercial speech can be some-
what more freely regulated than social or political speech broadly de-
fined.121
As it has thus far been conceived, a broad right to be forgotten in-
volves distinctive practical problems associated with a substantial el-
ement of government paternalism. Such an argument could easily be
further developed."2 The main focus of this article, however, has in-
stead been on the range of relevant and mutually reinforcing biases
and asymmetries, and on related practical considerations more gen-
erally. Each of the reinforcing practical concerns raised above adds
further pragmatic complications, particularly to the operation of any
broad-sweeping, generalized right to be forgotten.
At an extreme though, even pragmatic concerns for the risks, costs,
and sheer workability of any broad legal mechanism unavoidably
matters, we might factor in the possible attractiveness to some potential new creditors of a per-
son who has only recently discharged their debts in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Applicant Bankruptcy
on Credit Report, YOUCHECKCREDIT.COM, www.youcheckcredit.com/blog/2012/07 (last visited
Mar. 12, 2015).
119. This example assumes that, without distinction among carrot producers, no carrots
contain cholesterol. See Nina K. Hauptman, Carrots and Cholesterol, LIVESTRONG.COM (Jan.
30, 2014), http://www.livestrong.com/article/292060-carrots-cholesterol/.
120. See generally Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (determining
commercial speech restrictions for certain pharmaceutical advertisements are unconstitutional);
R. George Wright, The Openness of the Commercial Speech Test and the Value of Self-Realization, 88
U. DET. MERcY L. REV. 17 (2011) (arguing that a reasonableness test for commercial speech
would promote self-realization).
121. See Wright, supra note 120; R. George Wright, Electoral Lies and the Broader Problems of
Strict Scrutiny, 56 FLA. L. REV. 759, 784-87 (2012). It is also unclear how much policy weight
should be accorded to any internet posting that does not rise to the level of speech on a matter
of public interest or concern. See sources cited supra note 73.
122. See the preferred counterspeech or "more speech" remedy for allegedly bad speech
championed by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,372,377 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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begin to merge with fundamental relevant moral and political princi-
ples. Dystopias, in the extreme case, may manifest as systematic and
mutually reinforcing biases, severe asymmetries of information and
motivation, and policy distortions and inefficiencies. Any such polit-
ical or moral concern may seem irrelevant if we simplistically think
of a right to be forgotten as the merely straightforward universal em-
powerment of individuals, and perhaps of small groups. 3 But for
every individual who is empowered by a legally enforced cleaning of
the personal internet slate, many other individuals, disproportion-
ately those who cannot easily afford the most productive internet
searches, 124 may lose realistic access to usable information without
their knowledge or consent.
One might argue in response that the lost information was author-
itatively deemed to be outdated or irrelevant,125 at least for such pur-
poses as the relevant decision maker was able to envision. It is unnec-
essary to reiterate the systematic biases and asymmetries that predict-
ably tend to distort such determinations. Rather, the primary concern
is that determining which items of information should be widely ac-
cessible is made not by an empowered individual, but, ultimately, by
a government or a court that sets the criteria for search engine corpo-
rations and other private actors to follow. It is certainly worth consid-
ering society's comfort with a for-profit entity like Google making
discretionary public policy decisions. However, if the corporate deci-
sion rules are ultimately set in general terms by governments, it is
unclear that individual persons are thereby distinctly empowered.
In the end, it is certainly understandable that contemporary Euro-
peans in particular, given the history of the twentieth century, would
be especially anxious about personal privacy. 26 But it is far from clear
why the best response to nightmarish historic centralized govern-
mental abuse of privacy is to entrust decisions as to the relevance and
123. Whether and how any broad personal right to be forgotten should be extended to
groups, large or small, and to various sorts of corporate entities, will be left to defenders of such
a right.
124. See sources cited supra note 75.
125. See generally supra Part II.
126. See Craig Timberg & Michael Birnbaum, In Google Case, E.U. Court Says People Are Enti-
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significance of information, in unforeseen contexts, to a few multina-
tionals, and ultimately to centralized governments.'27 It seems more
reasonable to entrust such decisions to the various people who may
be affected, positively or negatively, by how sensibly they respond to
and discount the information in question."2 The exercise of discre-
tionary authority to grant or withhold access to information, whether
by one or more international profit-seeking entities or by centralized
governments, where it is not systematically skewed as described
above, may well tend to track the perceived interests of that decision
maker. Those interests may not correspond to the interests of affected
individuals or the broader public.'29
CONCLUSION
The idea of a broad-sweeping right to be forgotten, in whatever
form it is proposed, inevitably raises fundamental questions. It is
tempting to try to make sound, broad legal policy by somehow pit-
ting the value of informational privacy, however defined, against an
equally vague and general right of access to information itself. A de-
bate at that level of competing abstract rights, however, distorts the
issues without encouraging genuine progress in understanding.
The approach taken in this Article has focused on the systematic
and mutually reinforcing patterns of biases and asymmetries likely,
in practice, to distort, in predictable ways, the practical operation of
any version of a generalized right to be forgotten. Some of the crucial
biases and asymmetries reflect familiar psychologies, cognitive lim-
its, incentives, and patterns of interests of persons and institutions, as
127. See id. For a discussion of extreme cases of government control of decisions as to the
obsolescence or irrelevance of information, see VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIR-
TUE OF FORGETTING IN A DIGITAL AGE 120-21 (rev. ed. 2009). See also GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 204
(Harcourt Brace Javanovich Inc. ed., Penguin Books 1983) (1949) ("' [w]ho controls the past con-
trols the future; who controls the present controls the past"').
128. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. For the inevitable dispersal of knowledge
about relevance, risks, discounting, and value, see sources cited supra note 74.
129. One of the developers of the World Wide Web has recently spoken of potential corpo-
rate and governmental abuses. See Matthew Sprakes, Sir Tim Berners-Lee: World Needs an 'Inter-
net Magna Carta,' TELEGRAPH (Sept. 29, 2014 at 10:43 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/news/11127557/Berners-Lee-world-needs-an-internet-Magna-Carta.html ("[s]ud-
denly the power to abuse the open internet has become so tempting both for government and
big companies"). Note, as one potential avenue for future abuse, that Google "regularly receives
requests from government agencies and courts around the world to remove content from
Google products." Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE, www.google.com/
transparencyreport/removals/government (last visited May 20, 2015).
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recognized in common experience and supported by the available so-
cial science evidence. On this basis, this Article has instead recom-
mended a range of better understood, fine-tuned, particularized, and
more contextualized common law and statutory privacy-oriented
remedies, as continually amended in the interests of socio-economic
fairness and equality. Given this more attractive alternative path, a
broadly generalized right to be forgotten should be subject to a recall.

